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1.?Introduction
In Japanese industrial business practices, the 
importance of relationships is not necessarily 
emphasized. Actually, there are many firms that 
have tried to build and maintain good relation-
ships with customers. From a research perspec-
tive, this phenomenon has been discussed by 
using concepts like switching costs, transaction 
costs, among other approaches.
Succinctly put, the dark side of business 
relationships is another topic within the market-
ing research field. (cf. Anderson and Jap, 2005). 
How can we define the dark side of business 
relationships? For example, in the field of new 
product development, a closed relationship may 
extinguish, even kill an innovative idea. (cf. the 
concept of value network by Christensen, 1997). 
In a typical Japanese business network, not every 
company is profitable. Few companies earn the 
majority of profits. In other words, those relation-
ships may not build upon a reciprocal base. 
Companies expect to improve their performance 
by building and keeping relationships with their 
customers. But when a relationship gets too tight, 
so to speak, it might subsequently worsen revenue 
and/or damage profit performance. That is, a 
“good” relationship is not necessarily good.
Why do these kind of problems occur? What 
particular problems reveal themselves in a good 
relationship? This is the central research ques-
tion.
Anticipating my subsequent conclusion, it 
entails “in the beginning was the network” (Ford 
and Redwood, 2005). Any company has it own 
network. And the network will extend, curtail, 
and switch from one to the other. All of these 
make the relationships in the network change. 
Then the structure of the network will decide the 
output of relationship building.
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In order to further discuss this topic, I will 
introduce a case approach that describes the 
process of how a German electronic parts manu-
facturer attempted to enter the Japanese market. 
Because of the inherent tight network structure 
of Japanese electronic parts industries, the result 
of direct entry was failure. After this initial failure, 
this firm tried to enter the Japanese market via 
help from a Japanese paint distributor. As a result, 
the entry of the German electronic parts manu-
facturer was successful. The factor leading to 
success was the paint business network that the 
Japanese paint distributor nurtured. However, 
generalizing it as a simple success story would 
be analytically only scratching the surface. I will 
elaborate those details later. Here, I would prefer 
to propose the importance of realizing what 
structure of said network that this particular 
business was based upon. Only by focusing upon 
the character of this network structure can com-
panies hope to build a constructive relationships 
and maintain them.
In order to make our further our discussion, 
I structured our paper as follows. First, we will 
have a brief literature review. Then I will intro-
duce the case study model and analyse it theo-
retically. Proceeding these steps, we will attempt 
to argue what ultimately defines a good relation-
ship. That is the central topic in this paper.
2.?Brief literature review and theoreti-
cal background
As mentioned above, we would like to dis-
cuss the case of German electronic parts manu-
facturer. So we should review researches on the 
foreign market entry. Though there were a lot of 
studies in terms of entry strategy, there are a few 
studies that were treated with relationship 
aspects. Leonidou et al. (2006) was one of these 
studies. Their interests based upon buyer–seller 
relationships in international markets. According 
to their explanation, traditional exporting 
research indicated that this developmental export 
pattern is largely associated with the limited 
information that the firm has on international 
markets, which is characterized by higher busi-
ness uncertainty, greater psychological distance, 
and more adverse conditions (Leonidou et al. 
2006, pp. 576–577). However, from the relation-
ship view, another explanation can be addressed. 
That is, the exporting firm initiated, developed 
and sustained business relationships with foreign 
customers, while the rate of generating a portfo-
lio of such relationships will be subject to the 
degree of uncertainty, distance, and conflict 
perceived to exist in each relationship.
As Leonidou et al. (2006) study suggests that 
relationship view sometimes takes a new account 
for previous research agenda. In the relationship 
marketing (RM) studies, this sort of topic is one 
of the researchers’ main themes. The importance 
of good relationship is widely accepted by market-
ing researchers. And the relationship marketing 
had been emerged as a dominant mantra in 
business strategy circles (Palmatier et al. 2006). 
Both in the business practice and the academic 
research, RM had “experienced explosive 
growth” in the past decade (Srinivasan and 
Moorman 2005). Morgan and Hunt (1994) had 
defined RM as “all marketing activities directed 
toward establishing, developing, and maintaining 
successful relational exchanges” (Morgan and 
Hunt 1994, p. 22) Most of researchers and busi-
ness consultants assume that RM helps to gener-
ate stronger customer relationships and enhances 
the sellers’ performances, including sales growth, 
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share, and profits (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 
1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994).
Anderson and Narus (2004, p. 21) stressed 
the importance of relationships from a business 
point of view. They claimed that a “firm’s success 
in business markets depends directly on its 
working relationships.” And in their work of 1990, 
Anderson and Narus indicated that a distributor 
contributed to establish a good partnership with 
the manufacturer. Overall, both in the researches 
and practices, and no matter in consumer or 
business markets, there is a strong agreement of 
good relationship is a key factor toward the suc-
cess in marketing.
As mentioned above, we know the relation-
ship is important, but for managerial implications, 
we have not known what kind of relationship is 
important. So agenda might be focus on what 
kind of relationship should be built. Before to 
consider this agenda theoretically, we will briefly 
see the old proverb, “birds of a feather flock 
together” is a good reference. It means we are 
usually to expand our relationships to those are 
close or like ourselves. Put these words into the 
industrial business context, it means when a 
company try to extend its business, it usually 
starts from the field that is familiar to the com-
pany. And because of the familiarity, the business 
occurs from the old relationships. That is a reason 
why industrial companies prefer to deepen their 
relationships with their old partners.
However, familiarity with old relationships is 
not always good for international business exten-
sions. For example, Loane and Bell (2006) inves-
tigated the conditions of internationalization 
among entrepreneurial firms in Australia, Canada, 
Ireland and New Zealand. They conducted some 
in-depth interviews with 53 CEOs from entrepre-
neurial firms. 25 per cent of these firms actively 
used existing networks to develop their interna-
tional businesses, and or improve their interna-
tional competitiveness. However, about 34 per 
cent of these firms showed that they had to build 
new networks to advance the nature of their 
existence. In other words, building a new network 
is relatively important in the field of international 
business proliferation.
Therefore, I will focus on the boundary 
spanning function of industrial distributors. The 
boundary spanning function means a bridge of 
different networks. The concept of “the strength 
of weak tie (Granovetter 1973)” refers to the 
problem of spanning new networks. But I must 
add that the concept is not a fully refined one. In 
order to take one further step, I will refer to the 
concept of “structural holes” (Burt 1992), because 
the “structural holes” concept had previously 
refined “the strength of weak tie” concept.
According to Burt (1992), who had applied 
the concept of “structural holes” in his empirically 
supported approach, got the following results.
The term “structural holes” means “the 
separation between nonredundant contacts”, it is 
“a relationship of nonredundancy between two 
contacts” (Burt 1992, p. 18). In other words, the 
structural holes are not holes that are empty, but 
they are holes connected by weak ties, and they 
are the opportunities to gain different information 
from those who are not familiar to you now. This 
is similar to Loane and Bell (2006)’s findings. 
They found in their research, most of CEOs of 
entrepreneurial firms tried to get new information 
from their new networks.
In Burt’s idea, “given two networks of equal 
size, the one with more nonredundant contacts 
provides more benefits. There is little gain from 
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a new contact redundant with existing contacts”. 
So Burt claimed that “time and energy would be 
better spent cultivating a new contact to unap-
proached populations. Maximizing the nonredun-
dancy of contacts maximizes the structural holes 
obtained per contact” (Burt 1992, p. 20).
And he explained the difference between 
“weak ties” and “structural holes” according with 
the following. “The weak tie argument is about 
the strength of relationships at the same time 
that it is about their location”. “The structural 
hole argument is about the chasm spanned. It is 
the latter that generates information benefits. 
Whether a relationship is strong or weak, it 
generates information benefits when it is a bridge 
over a structural hole” (Burt 1992, p. 28).
According to Burt (1992), there are three 
classes of structural holes shown in Figure 1. 
They are (a) holes between the cluster around 
contact A and everyone in your own cluster, for 
example, the hole between contacts A and C; (b) 
holes between the cluster around contact B and 
everyone in your own cluster, for example, the 
hole between contacts B and C; and (c) the hole 
between contacts A and B. And about the weak 
ties, he explained as below. “YOU are best posi-
tioned for information benefits, contacts A and B 
are next, followed by everyone else. YOU have 
two weak ties, contacts A and B have one each, 
and everyone else has none. YOU have the larg-
est volume of structural holes between your 
contacts, contacts A and B have fewer, and eve-
ryone else has few or none”. (Burt 1992, p. 27)
“The argument can now be summarized with 
a concept defining the extent to which a player’s 
network is rich in structural holes, and thus rich 
in entrepreneurial opportunity, and thus rich in 
information and control benefit. The concept is 
structural autonomy” (Burt, 1992, p. 44)
“The rate of returns is keyed to the social 
structure of the competitive arena. Each player 
has a network of contacts within a competitive 
arena. Certain players are connected to certain 
others, dependent on exchange with certain 
others. Something about the structure of the 
player’s network and the location of the player’s 
contacts in the social structure of the arena 
defines the player’s chances of getting higher 
rates of return on investment. The chances are 
enhanced by two kinds of network benefits, 
information and control” (Burt, 1992, pp. 45–47) 
one. Thus, we may conclude Burt’s findings as 
the followings.
Profit = Investment * rate of return
The factor of “investment” related to “ques-
tion of production”, and the factor of “rate of 
return” related to “question of opportunity”. And 
the question of opportunity refers to the com-
petitive advantage of structural holes. About the 
competitive advantage of structural holes have 
been noted in table 1.
Burt (1992) summarized his argument that 
“players with contract network optimized for 
structural holes—players with networks provid-
Figure 1   Structural holes and weak ties (Burt, 1992, 
p. 27)
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ing high structural autonomy—enjoy higher rates 
of return on their investments because they know 
about, have a hand in, and exercise control over, 
more rewarding opportunities”. (Burt, 1992, p. 
46)
According to Burt’s idea, we might say that 
the company who can find the structural holes 
among the other companies, and span them 
selectively, then those companies which con-
sisted of structural holes could enjoy more ben-
efits from the new connection from the structural 
holes. It is the role of an industrial distributor 
(Hlavacek and McCuistion 1983). So, we will 
explore this role in the subsequent case.
3.?Methodology
Case study is a commonly used in business 
and management research since it allows for a 
processional and contextual analysis (Yin 1991). 
And this methodology is suited to searching for 
deeper explanations of said phenomenon. The 
case study approach is appropriate for under-
standing the dynamics of phenomena (Bonoma 
1985). Our aim is to catch those dynamics and 
therefore that is why I choose this approach.
We had had eight interviews to O-well from 
November 2005 to April 2006. The interviewees 
included the president, chief manager of planning 
department, and five managers who were involved 
in the “Electronics Project” (“E-project” hereafter 
as well). Beside interviews, we also asked our 
questions to O-well via telephone, e-mail, and 
applied my full consulting energies toward it. The 
information about Micronas and DENSO were 
described by the interviewees in O-well.
4.?Case Study
As we stated in the introduction, we treat 
each case of technology-based small firms that 
entered the Japanese market, in this section. 
First, I will describe three firms, Micronas, 
DENSO, and O-well. Then we will focus on a 
specified project organized by them. Through this 
work, we will suggest the role of structural holes.
Micronas
Micronas is a semiconductor designer and 
manufacturer with worldwide operations. It is a 
leading supplier of cutting-edge IC and sensor 
system solutions for consumer and automotive 
electronics. It serves all major consumer brands 
worldwide, many of them in continuous partner-
ships seeking joint success. While the holdings 
are headquartered in Zurich (Switzerland), 
operational headquarters are based in Freiburg 
(Germany). Currently, the Micronas Group 
employs about ?,??? people. In ???? it generated 
CHF ??? million in sales.
Table 1 Competitive Advantage of Structural Holes (Burt 1992, p. 46)
Kind of advantage Substance of advantage Social structural condition responsible for the advantage
Information benefits Access, timing and referrals Contact redundancy and structural holes:
Network trust, size & diversity, cohesion & structural 
equivalence efficient-effective networks structural holes & 
weak ties
Control benefits Tertius Gaudens, entrepre-
neurial motivation
Structural autonomy:
Holes & entrepreneurial opportunity, primary holes & con-
straint, secondary holes & constraint, hole signature & 
structural autonomy
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In order to deal with Japanese automobile 
manufacturers and their parts suppliers, Mirconas 
Japan, a branch of Micronas, had been estab-
lished in ????. However, the effort of building its 
own distribution channel failed. This forced 
Micronas Japan to choose a Japanese agency to 
seriously enter the Japanese market.
DENSO
DENSO is one of the largest automobile 
parts suppliers in the world. In fiscal ????, the 
year ended March ??, ????, DENSO reported 
another year of record results. Consolidated net 
sales increased ??.?% year on year to ¥?,???.? 
billion (??.? billion Euro, ? Euro = ??? Yen, 
hereafter as well), exceeding ¥? trillion (?? billion 
Euro) for the first time. Operating income rose 
??.?% to ¥???.? billion (?.?? billion Euro), and net 
income jumped ??.?% to ¥???.? billion (?.?? billion 
Euro). DENSO was established as Nippon 
DENSO Co., Ltd. having been separated from 
Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. with ¥?? million (??? 
thousand Euro) capital in ????.
O-well
O-well is an independent industrial distribu-
tor. In this article, we use “independent industrial 
distributor” as following. The firm is usually 
consisting of only a handful of sales and support 
people. Unlike manufacturer’s representatives, 
who take on the role of sales representatives and 
work on a commission basis, industrial distribu-
tors take possession of the products they sell and 
assume the role of partner with several manufac-
turers.
O-well was founded in ???? as Ohmi Kogyo 
Co. LTD (Ohmi Kogyo hereafter as well) at 
Osaka, Japan. Ohmi Kogyo was founded to treat 
the transaction of paint and coatings. The paint 
and its material had become to be governmental 
control goods in ????. In order to grasp informa-
tion about the Japanese government and General 
Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), Ohmi Kogyo was 
forced to establish its Tokyo branch. Since then, 
the branch network had been expanded widely 
in Japan. The branch network was expanded 
according to important customer. The subsidiary 
companies were established according to busi-
ness of important customer. There are seven 
subsidiary companies under O-well group now. 
Uni-electronics Inc. is the subsidiary that estab-
lished in ????, the first established subsidiary of 
O-well. The business of Ohmi Kogyo was 
extended, so the name of the company was 
changed into ?O-well Corporation? in ????. It is 
a new name which merges ?WELL.? with ?O? that 
comes from ?Ohmi Kogyo Co. LTD?.
O-well has grown to be a industrial goods 
trading company with capitalization of ??? million 
yen (?.?? million Euro) and annual sales of ?? 
billion yen (??.? million Euro) in ????. Now, 
O-well have ?? branch offices and three colors-
mixing factories. And O-well is dealing with not 
only paint but also paint equipment, interior 
design goods, miscellaneous goods and so on. 
O-well not only sells paint and paint equipment, 
but also contracted to design and to manage the 
painting process of a customer companies. 
Moreover, O-well is dealing with electronic prod-
ucts, building materials through seven subsidiar-
ies, and forms a large group of industrial goods. 
It remains as O-well?s competitive advantage.
“E-project” of O-well
In February ????, the ?E-project? had been 
Japanese Relationship Marketing ???
initiated in the merchandise department of O-well. 
Actually, the purpose of this project was not 
well-defined at that moment. There was no mar-
ket survey or any empirically-based estimation of 
their target market, when they decided to start 
this business. There were only two group staff 
assigned to this department from the very begin-
ning. The purpose of establishing this department 
was that they wanted to make provisions for their 
paint business, the core business of O-well, by 
joining this rapidly expanding electronics market.
They started their businesses in this elec-
tronics market with three products, ?register 
parts?, ?optical fiber for telecommunication net-
work?, and ?hall effect ICs?, in April ????. All of 
these three products are purchased from other 
companies. The trading routes are as follows. The 
register parts are purchased from Kansai Paint 
Co. and going to be sold to the printed-circuit 
board manufacturers. The optical fiber is a prod-
uct of Sumitomo-?M Co., and planned to be sold 
to the, generically titled, Information Technology 
(IT) industry. And the ?hall effect ICs? is the 
product of Micronas and planned to be sold to 
the automobile parts manufacturers.
In the beginning, the E-project staff regarded 
register parts and optical fiber products as their 
main merchandize. In restrospect, they secured 
orders for their registered parts in April ????. 
For instance, the order from Meiko Electronics 
Co. LTD, a print-circuit board manufacturer for 
the Mask Coater System, contributed O-well 
revenue of ?? million Yen (??? thousand Euro). 
But, O-well did not manage this business with 
any particular success.
In the optical fiber products business, O-well 
got their orders from DDI Co. LTD, a large tel-
ecommunication company in Japan, in July ????. 
The amount of this order was ?? million Yen 
(???.? thousand Euro). However, in this business 
standardizing your product was necessary. That 
meant that it was difficult to secure a functional 
differentiation. Because of the nature of this 
business it was easy to get into sharp price 
competition, O-well could not secure a pricing 
advantage from Sumitomo-?M, thus ultimately 
this situation forced O-well to withdraw from this 
business sector.
E-project initially started with three mer-
chandize. After losing two of them, the ?hall effect 
ICs? was the only product remaining. E-project 
staff regarded the ?hall effect ICs? business as a 
difficult to sustain business sector. After a long 
struggle, O-well had set the ?hall effect ICs? on 
its E-project at April ????.
The ?hall effect ICs? technology is a technol-
ogy that applies non-contact IC to sense the 
movements of objects. Hall effect ICs can easily 
detect stray magnetic fields. O-well tried to apply 
this product pertaining to automobile parts. By 
doing the paint business, O-well has some con-
nections with automobile manufacturers. O-well 
tried to ask the automobile manufacturers to 
introduce the ?hall effect ICs? to some parts 
manufacturers. In contrast to O-well?s expecta-
tion, there was no automobile manufacturer 
responding that it would like to try this. Finally, 
O-well had decided to make contact with parts 
manufacturers directly. In June ????, they got an 
opportunity to attend a small conference for the 
new product development in DENSO, a critical 
parts manufacturer in the supply chain of Toyota. 
O-well also had an opportunity to do a presenta-
tion of the ?hall effect ICs? to various R&D staff, 
including IC technology, ABS technology, and 
electronics parts purchase. Unfortunately, this 
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effort didn?t harvest O-well any business results.
Although O-well could not get any orders at 
that time, they had made their own staff realize 
what ?hall effect ICs? really is. This failure assisted 
O-well get further accustomed to further develop 
their own sales promotions. After this presenta-
tion, there were several inquiries for this technol-
ogy from some manufacturers. In order to 
respond to these inquiries, O-well planned its own 
presentation with a technological staff from 
Micronas.
In July ????, O-well contacted Micronas and 
became its agent to run the business in Japan. 
However it was not a simple accomplishment. 
Even though many parts manufacturers were 
interested in this technology, they hesitated to 
introduce it into their product lines. Because, 
pricing of the ?hall effect IC? was higher than the 
price of previous parts, and also there was still 
some technological problem in its application. 
Especially, most Japanese semiconductor manu-
facturers were not familiar with this technology. 
Furthermore, their downstream-manufacturers 
did not express whether they employed this 
technology or not. So various hindrances occured 
not only from the suppliers, but also from end 
users.
By applying ?hall effect IC? technology, we 
can transform a mechanical treatment into an 
electric treatment even if there is not any physical 
contact between two parts. The less the physical 
contacts among parts, the less mechanical friction 
will occur. When the friction among parts can be 
reduced, then the resultant contact failures will 
occur. However, even though engineers realized 
this logic, no one knew how to apply this logic. 
In other words, ?non-contact? was just an idea-
only concept at the time.
The one who embodied and integrated this 
ideal concept into actual parts manufacture was 
a manager in throttle valves at DENSO. Actually, 
there was an interesting episode behind this fact. 
That is, because the defective rate of their throt-
tle valve products were too high, a requirement 
for improvement had come from Toyota. In order 
to reduce the defective rate, they analyzed their 
products and found the physical friction among 
valve components were the main culprit. When 
they discovered this issue, the technical logic was 
linked to its usage.
According to our interviews, a manager of 
DENSO told one of our interviewees, ?He was 
demoted from another business department, and 
knew nothing about throttle valves?. So even 
there was still some risk to take on this new 
technology into their product, nevertheless he 
risked everything on it.
The new technology found a new usage. But 
it doesn?t mean new business comes along based 
on consequence. The character of automobile 
parts business is ?design-in.? That is, every part 
in a car was determined in the design phase. So 
that, if they want to extend their new valves 
business, they have to wait till the development 
of a new car or the timing of full model change. 
Actually, O-well accompany with DENSO locked 
their focus on the full model change of ?Windom 
(Lexus ES??? export model)? in ????.
As a result, in May ????, a new style of 
electronic controlled throttle valve that used the 
?hall effect IC? was installed into the new model 
of ?Windom?. At that time, the total amount of 
production for ?hall effect IC? was just ?,??? pieces 
per month. It was not a considerable amount, 
however they anticipated the amount would go 
up. And the high defective rate of throttle valve 
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has been reduced to almost zero, which won them 
official approval from Toyota.
Because of this success, other departments 
of DENSO introduced the ?hall effect ICs? tech-
nology into their own sectors. Also it influenced 
the the opinions of other automobile manufactur-
ers, such as Honda and Nissan. The sales amount 
of ?hall effect ICs? in O-well was ?? million yen 
(??? thousand Euro) in ????. It increased dra-
matically to ??? million yen (?.?? million Euro) 
in ????.
Sales amount kept going up, ?,??? million 
yen (?? million Euro) in ????, ?,??? million yen 
(?? million Euro) in ????, ?,??? million yen (??.? 
million Euro) in ????. And the ?E-project? team 
was promoted from the merchandising depart-
ment to become the electronics department. In 
fiscal year ????, the profitability drove this depart-
ment into the black. And of fiscal year ????, 
remaining accumulated loss had been cleared.
5.?Case Analysis
According to Anderson and Nurus (????) 
and Nurus and Anderson (????), they indicated 
that an industrial distributor could play a role to 
build relationships between suppliers and users.
In the case I proposed, a good or contructive 
relationship is very important. Actually, before 
the tie-up between Micronas and O-well, Micronas 
intended to enter the Japanese market on their 
own. They founded a subsidiary called Micronas 
Japan, which would sell ?hall effect ICs? to 
Japanese automobile industry in ????. But 
Mirconas Japan had not built good relationships 
with their customers.
On the other hand, O-well still had relation-
ships with automobile manufacturers and their 
parts suppliers, they were not that helpful in the 
proliferation of ?hall effect ICs? business. As a 
result, O-well was notably successful in selling 
the ?hall effect ICs? to DENSO, but the business 
opportunity took a great deal of time to develop. 
One day, a certain personnel at Nissan gave 
information about the new product development 
study to DENSO. It was not secretive session; 
anyone who had any technology could attend this 
meeting. O-well, of course, attended this session 
with the ?hall effect ICs?.
What I want to expound upon is, O-well had 
already had some close relationships with DENSO 
in the paint business, but O-well did not know 
they could use these relationships to ask those 
in attendance to the new product development 
studies in DENSO. After O-well introduced the 
?hall effect ICs? into DENSO, there were several 
feedback response from some of its engineers, 
but they were just responses, not becoming core 
business. The one who applied this IC into prod-
ucts initially was a manager demoted from 
another department. He knew nothing about 
throttle valve business, IC technology, and didn?t 
have any relationship with O-well. That is why I 
noted, a good relationship will not bring a good 
or contructive business imperatively, or conse-
quently.
Here, we would like to summarize our argu-
ments utilizing Fig. ?. The left-upper figure shows 
the relationships that existed among paint sup-
pliers, O-well, the distributor, and the paint end-
users (Phase ?). In these paint transactions, 
O-well played the role that spanned a structural 
hole. Because of the advantageous position, 
O-well attempts to use it to extend its hall effect 
IC business.
The right-upper figure (Phase ?) shows the 
failure of the direct entry to Japan market that 
?????????????????? ?????
Micronas had been made. Because of the network 
within Japanese electronic parts industry is so 
tight it gave Micronas little or no chance to enter. 
After this failure, Micronas tried to use the local 
network. And Micronas aimed its target toward 
O-well. Because O-well had already had some 
networking in the paint industry as indicated in 
Phase ?.
As we had mentioned above, O-well has a 
strong position in the paint network, that makes 
O-well believes it is possible to extend the ?hall 
effect IC? business for Micronas. But, actually, 
the strong position in the paint network, didn?t 
work well in the electronic parts business. The 
figure at the lower-left shows this situation (Phase 
?).
The turning point did not come until a key 
player (DENSO X) was found within the network. 
As we depicted in Phase ?, ?DENSO X? was a 
central player who belonged to the DENSO 
cluster, but he is not involved with the existing 
electronic parts network. In other words, this 
player is working in the electronic parts industry 
but did not commit to the existing network, so to 
speak. As a result, this participant has high 
degree of freedom. This ?free? character makes 
him pursue decision making methods more chal-
lenging than other partcipants would. So, he was 
free to use this ?hall effect ICs? even if he did not 
know any past reputation of the parent firm. The 
lower-right figure shows the successful result of 
the ?hall effect IC? business (Phase ?).
6.?Discussion
Generally speaking, in order to reduce the 
transaction costs, industrial companies like to 
build a steady relationship with certain compa-
nies. To build a good and or contructive relation-
ship, some adaptations might be required. These 
adaptation requirements ask both sides of com-
panies to invest some resources in them 
(Håkansson ed. ????; Cannon and Perreault 
????).
Anderson and Jap (????), however, discussed 
some dark sides of the close relationships. They 
suggest that several investments to make adapta-
tions can improve their partner?s productivity and 
efficiency and enable both partners to receive 
greater returns than they could have obtained on 
their own. But over the long run, the parties may 
lose touch with alternatives that represent a 
better way to do things and thus may fail to 
innovate (Anderson and Jap, p. ??).
In our case, although the ?hall effect IC? 
revealed dissatisfaction to the old suppliers net-
works, Denso failed to employ it, for Micronas?s 
reputation. We may say that Denso might have 
failed to innovate at that time, because no one 
employed this new technology, even though the 
defective rate of the throttle valve was high. Only 
DENSO X did who was outside of existing net-
work.
This phenomenon is illustrated in Phase ? 
of Figure ?. In Phase ?, the players isolated one 
another in the user cluster shown in this situation. 
This situation enables one to find new usage for 
the hall effect ICs. Denso X desired new technol-
ogy and parts for its throttle valve, because of a 
high defective rate. Denso X felt dissatisfaction 
among existing networks. This network was 
fragile. This situation was depicted in Phase ?. 
Any player on the demand side cluster did not 
contact with each other at that time. Micronas 
could sell the ?hall effect ICs? to Denso X, if 
Micronas developed a new supplier network for 
throttle valves using the ?hall effect ICs? from 
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scratch. Who could secure the opportunity with-
out recognizing an existing business chance? 
There is a structural hole between them. O-well 
did join together with them, for a resultant inde-
pendent distributor role.
In order to gain further insight on both of 
these issues, we observed some clues from Burt 
(????) and Pitt et al. (????). They are the concept 
of network, structural holes, and structural 
autonomy. It is a dominant realization toward to 
the industrial business. But there are some dark 
sides on the close relationships. The concepts of 
structural holes and autonomy are the keys to 
solve the problem that come from dark sides of 
close relationships. Saying these in other words, 
industrial business usually runs on a relationship 
that likes network. But in order to increase more 
benefit, the members on a network should not 
just response to the requirement that comes from 
other member. What network members act pro-
gressively is the key to increase the benefit on 
the network. How to act progressively? To our 
idea, that is chasing entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties. More concrete, that is, contacting to the 
member who is not familiar and through this 
contact to get different kind of information. The 
different kind of information is a possibility to the 
new business.
Another question arises, that is, who should 
play the role of chasing entrepreneurial opportu-
nity with regards to the whole network? We 
suggest that the industrial distributor is said 
chaser. There are two notable reasons. The first 
one is, manufacturer has pressure to get higher 
ROI from production. This pressure makes 
manufacturers adverse to try new technologies. 
Figure 2  Network transformations and subsequent evolving relationships
?????????????????? ?????
The second reason is, the technology driven 
companies was sometimes embedded in value 
networks that pursue excellent technology. This 
consideration also would lock onto and target 
entrepreneurial opportunity.
From this point of view, the industrial dis-
tributor has no pressure from initial considerable 
investment on the production process and no 
restriction from technology, that makes it easier 
to move than other members within the business 
network. In other words, the commercial capital 
are more fluid and easier to shift from one net-
work to the other than the traditional industrial 
capital. We also can declare, with some reserva-
tion, chasing entrepreneurial opportunities is the 
domain that industrial distributors can co-exist. 
From the case that we described above, O-well, 
the industrial distributor played a key role as the 
bridge to introduce technology that Micronas 
owns toward DENSO. It may be said, in free 
economies, DENSO and Micronas would have a 
sufficient possibilities to begin their businesses 
without O-well. Furthermore it is because these 
two companies have their own strong separate 
network, respectively.
Lastly, Micronas was self-alienated to the 
Japanese market which made the connection 
between Micronas and other companies weak or 
difficult to nurture. Both of these two reasons 
reduced the possibility of direct connection 
between Micronas and DENSO. This weak con-
nection represents a structural hole for O-well. 
When O-well plays the role as ?bridge,? the chasm 
between Micronas and DENSO, all of these three 
companies reaped benefits from said network.
7. Conclusion
My main finding in this paper is a good 
relationship may not be always good ro construc-
tive. It is because a good relationship may make 
the relationship constrained. In order to loosen 
the constraints of a taxed relationship, switching 
among the line of various relationships might be 
one of the alternatives. And the key player who 
can change this stiff relationship, used to exist 
outside of the old network. An industrial dis-
tributor, does not like a manufacturer, work 
independently. Subsequently, an industrial dis-
tributor may find it easier to explore and investi-
gate out more isolated network players and build 
a totally new network together with them. One 
might conclude this high flexibility of building 
networks is the strength of an industrial distribu-
tor.
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